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Due diligence has a stable if malleable, presence in international law often starting 
as soft law guidance that over time hardens into legal rules and principles. While 
it is possible to refer to elements of due diligence broadly, the exact scope of the 
concept depends on the regulatory or international law context in which it is used – 
such as environmental law, human rights related to responsible business conduct, 
the elimination of violence against women, or rules around the supply of conflict 
minerals.
The EU has chosen due diligence as the vehicle to support and balance the 
effective implementation of benefit-sharing commitments set out in EUR 
511/2014.1 While one of the stated aims of the EUR is related to ‘improving 
conditions for legal certainty in connection with the utillisation of GR and 
ATK’2 the evolving nature of access and benefit-sharing (ABS) related behavior 
necessitates principles that can guide individuals and institutions when faced with 
unprecedented circumstances.
There are three critical and interconnected reasons that drive the need for this 
Recommendation. First due diligence lends itself well to constructive ambiguity 
that can be harnessed to build consensus around best practices. Secondly due 
diligence as a positive obligation is separate from the underlying responsibility 
to follow ABS rules in provider countries. Thirdly, if due diligence is not tethered 
to the foundational responsibility to respect ABS rules, it may encourage ‘tick-
box’ compliance that will frustrate the purpose of the Nagoya Protocol and the 
international consensus achieved under the Convention of Biological Diversity. 
 
This document is presented as a first guide to developing principles of due diligence 
that are specific to the access and benefit-sharing context in international law 
and as a guide to scientists, universities, technology managers and businesses 
navigating the line between legally required and ethically aspirational behavior. It is 
hoped that the community will return to this document to update and consolidate 
practices over time.
The Recommendation is the product of a Symposium on the Use and Circulation of 
Genetic Resources, conducted on the 11 and 12th of September at the London School 
of Economics. All participants are co-producers of this document. The Principles 
were informed by the results of a survey on 98 EU users of genetic resources 
and associated traditional knowledge. The project is led by Dr Siva Thambisetty 
Associate Professor of Law, LSE and was developed as part of the INMARE project 
funded by EU Horizon2020.
1 EUR 511/2014 on Compliance Measures for Users From the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union
2 Recital 9.
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T he Nagoya Protocol3 (NP) regulates the circulation and use of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, in order to implement the third objective of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) relating 
to ‘the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources’.4 
The Protocol requires that benefits arising from the 
utilization of Genetic Resources (GK) and Associated 
Traditional Knowledge (ATK) are shared fairly and 
equitably, thereby contributing to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. Among other aims, 
the Preamble recognizes the potential role of access 
and benefit-sharing (ABS) to contribute to achieving 
Millennium Development Goals, now referred to as the 
UN Sustainable Development Goals.5 
The Nagoya Protocol is addressed to State Parties, and 
does not apply directly to users and providers of genetic 
resources. In order for it to be applicable to individuals 
or non-State entities it must first be implemented at the 
national level. EU Regulation 511/2014 implements the 
Nagoya Protocol in the European Union by obligating 
Member States to legislate at the national level. 
The effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
through EUR 511/2014 relies on users of genetic 
resources, including scientists, pursuing a due diligence 
standard of conduct. A course of conduct that is diligent 
and reasonable under the Regulation must also align 
with the moral and legal responsibility to support the 
3 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity is a supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Available here https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/default.shtml
4 ‘the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to technologies’ (Art 1) available here https://www.cbd.
int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-01
5 See Goal 15, in particular target 15.6 ‘Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilllization of genetic resources and promote 
appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed. Available here https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/envision2030-goal15.html
6 Due diligence in international human rights law typically develops through soft law measures that harden into legal requirements. Due diligence lends itself 
to the context in which it unfolds, and therefore elaboration of this standard of conduct in the context of ABS rules is necessary. This is particularly true as 
anything other than the most egregious ‘harm’ in an ABS context can be diffuse or difficult to articulate. Although due diligence cannot be a defense to any 
liability under provider country laws, it can be used as an aid to discern the extent of the foundational responsibility on the part of individuals and institutions 
governed by implementing measures under EUR 511/2014 to further the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol internationally. 
7 Guidance document on the scope of application and core obligations of Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
compliance measures for users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilisation in the Union. 
 C/2016/5337 [Hereafter Guidance Document]. Available here https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.313.01.0001.01.ENG
effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. 
To this end, due diligence is a springboard rather than 
a cap, on justice and ethically minded behavior. 
The provisions of the EUR 511/2014 as enforced 
in national legislations in Member States will be 
interpreted and negotiated by those to whom it is 
addressed, as compliance practices related to the 
access and use of genetic resources evolve. This 
Recommendation is addressed to scientists and other 
users, and to the ecosystem of institutions that support 
the work they do. The compliance ecosystem in Europe, 
which includes scientific institutions, research councils, 
universities, research networks, research publications, 
businesses and corporate entities, must support users 
in their pursuit of due diligence in a manner that is 
in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Nagoya 
Protocol. 
This Recommendation is one of the first inter-
disciplinary attempts internationally to give content 
to the meaning of due diligence in an ABS context.6 
It builds on the due diligence requirements set out in 
the Regulation and the official Guidance document 
on EUR 511/20147, but does not replace legal advice 
on access requirements in the EUR or national ABS 
regulations in specific provider countries. This is a 
living document, which we hope will be updated by 
the community of users newly tasked with obligations 
intended to realize the Nagoya Protocol. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3323389 
LSE L AW  POLICY BRIEFING SERIES 4
1. General and Essential Characteristics of 
Due Diligence8
1.1 In EUR 511/2014 due diligence is an obligation of 
conduct applicable to individual users as well as 
entities of all sizes.9 
1.2 For multinational commercial entities general 
due diligence includes internationally recognized 
standards of responsible business conduct (RBC) 
as specified by OECD guidelines.
1.3 Due diligence must be appropriate to an individual 
or entity’s circumstances, including the limitations 
of individuals working within business or corporate 
relationships.
1.4 Due diligence processes are ongoing and 
responsive. They include feedback loops so that 
individuals and entities can progressively learn. 
They seek to prevent adverse implications and 
involve multiple processes and objectives.
1.5 It is recommended that each person or entity as 
user address their own responsibility with respect 
to adverse impacts of their action or non-action to 
the best of their ability.
1.6 Due diligence is a guide, and should not be treated 
as a cap, on actions that facilitate effective 
implementation of the EUR 511/2014 and 
objectives of the Nagoya Protocol. 
2. Due Diligence in an ABS context
2.1 Due diligence is a standard of conduct that is 
tethered to the foundational responsibility to 
mitigate adverse ABS related implications in light 
of the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol. 
2.2 Due diligence in an ABS context is both a standard 
of conduct and an obligation of result. If it 
becomes clear that prior informed consent (PIC) 
8 These essential characteristics and principles are of a general nature and adapted from the OECD Due Diligence for Responsible Business Conduct (30 May 
2018), the EUR 2017/821 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating 
from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (not yet in force), the EU Timber Regulation 995/2010 to the ABS context in light of the evolution of due diligence as 
a standard of conduct in international law, as well as from the text of and Guidance notes to EUR 511/2014.
9 Natural and legal person, See Guidance Document [2.4]
10 Guidance Document [3.1]. In international law due diligence is normally not a standard of result, only of conduct. EUR 511/2014 appears to introduce a limited 
standard of result extending to PIC (or equivalent) and MAT only. In EUR 511/2014 this is not however a standard of result that extends to ensuring that fair 
and equitably sharing of benefits takes place, the assumption is that legally enforceable contractual obligations represented by PIC and MAT suffice to ensure 
this. Notably, PIC and MAT are only needed if a specific country has regulations in place that require PIC and Mat. A country can decide not to require PIC and 
MAT. See Art 6.1 of the Nagoya Protocol.
11 EUR 511/2014 applies to ‘utilization by users in the EU’, and Art 4 that sets out the obligations of users only uses the term ‘ascertain’ with respect to due 
diligence by users based in the EU. In Article 4, there is no explicit reference to ‘access’ and whether due diligence must also be applied when it comes 
to following provider country laws. However this can be gathered from the wording of recital 24 and 9 (‘It is also essential to prevent the utilisation in the 
Union of genetic resources or traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, which were not accessed in accordance with the national access 
and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements of a Party to the Nagoya Protocol, and to support the effective implementation of benefit-sharing 
commitments set out in mutually agreed terms between providers and users’); and that users also have to ‘ascertain’ in Art 4 that benefits are fairly and 
equitably shared upon mutually agreed terms, in accordance with any applicable legislation or regulatory requirements.
12  While due diligence obligations of business organization under human rights guidance is not legally enforceable, there are many tools developed by NGOs to 
assess ‘impact’ and ‘adverse implications’ of actions taken on human rights. Similar efforts must be made by scientific bodies to explain and extrapolate the 
proximate and projected implications of not achieving the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol. 
or its equivalent and mutually agreed terms (MAT) 
should have (but have not) been obtained and the 
user cannot obtain the same, utilization must be 
discontinued.10 
2.3 The obligation of result in the EUR 511/2014 does 
not extend to ensuring contractual performance 
of mutually agreed benefit-sharing. Contractual 
performance would nonetheless benefit from 
due diligence standards of conduct because 
the foundational responsibility to facilitate the 
effective implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
remains.
2.4 Due diligence is not a defense against liability 
under provider country laws.11 Adequate efforts 
must be made to investigate and comply with local 
ABS laws at all times.
3. Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement
3.1 Where due diligence is related to provider country 
interaction, stakeholder engagement including with 
local communities who hold traditional knowledge, 
is best characterized by two-way communication 
and good faith on part of the participants on both 
sides. 
4. Impact studies and modeling of adverse 
implications
4.1 Initiatives to develop impact studies and models 
of adverse implications of conduct that falls short 
of diligent will help clarify the purpose and scope 
of due diligence. Adverse implications include 
frustrating the objectives of the Nagoya Protocol.
4.2 These impact studies will complement the 
development of best practices and tether such 
practices to the avoidance of adverse implications 
and to furthering the objectives of the Nagoya 
Protocol and EUR 511/2014.12
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5. Best practices and sector specific 
guidance
5.1 A best practice must adhere to the principles of 
due diligence both as a standard of conduct and 
an obligation of result, when appropriate.13
5.2 Best practices and sector specific guidance must 
align with the objectives of the EUR 511/2014 
including the effective implementation of the 
Nagoya Protocol.
6. The formation, performance and transfer 
of contractual obligations
6.1 Actions taken to negotiate, agree and perform 
contracts between users and providers must align 
with the responsibilities of all users to support 
the effective implementation of benefit-sharing 
as set out in mutually agreed terms under the 
Nagoya Protocol. The standard of conduct must 
be reasonable, affordable and facilitate legal 
certainty.14
6.2 Even where it is not possible to externally verify 
performance of contracts, change of intent and 
transfer to third parties must be conducted 
diligently. Such actions must aim to avoid 
or mitigate adverse or potentially adverse, 
implications for provider countries.15
6.3 If delaying benefit-sharing until a point at which 
there are benefits to be shared, due diligence must 
take account of the fact that provider countries 
often have little or no leverage on triggers for 
contractual performance.
6.4 Benefit-sharing can be as ambitious and 
aspirational as possible once all legal and 
procedural standards of conduct are met.
13 See n 10 above.
14 Agreements here refer to private law contracts that establish conditions of access, use of resources and sharing of benefits including in the pursuit of 
commercial and non-commercial research. 
15 It can be challenging to enforce any international contract. ABS contracts present additional difficulties. In a context in which harm sought to be avoided 
is difficult to conceptualize and external verification of performance triggers is nearly impossible, it is important to realize that that ABS contractual 
performance is in reality, mostly voluntary.
16 Young and Tvedt point out that given the difficulty of ensuring larger, more speculative benefits further down the line the temptation to settle for immediate 
and tangible benefits instead, is high for two reasons. First a secure small payment is often considered to be comparable in value to a speculative large 
payment. Second, a payment now is generally thought of as more valuable than a payment later. Young and Tvedt Drafting Successful Benefit Sharing Contracts 
(Brill 2017) p 141. Additionally there is nothing in the EUR that specifies when benefit-sharing obligations must be fulfilled, or how or when the provider’s 
benefit-share should be calculated.
17 EUR 511/2014 does not provide a scheme for benefit-sharing beyond due diligence in compliance with local provider country laws.
18 As in the human rights context, this might require asking difficult questions of collaborators and colleagues. Such scrutiny however is essential to ensure that 
contractual intent at the beginning of the access process is not frustrated.
19 See Art 7 on scope of disclosure obligations in EUR 2017/821.
6.5 Benefits upfront in favor of delayed and 
speculative but potentially larger benefits must be 
agreed in as transparent a manner as possible.16
6.6 Benefit-sharing does not depend on the 
commerciali-zation of the results of the utilization 
of genetic resource, and scientists and researchers 
must strive to share benefits in accordance with 
mutually agreed terms.17
7. Scrutiny of Third Party Conduct
7.1 Due diligence is the standard of care with which 
third party actions and intent must be investigated 
and scrutinized. 
7.2 Due diligence requires users to use suitable 
leverage with collaborators and third parties to 
abide by the terms of access and benefit-sharing 
agreements.18 
7.3 Commercial impetus and the demands for 
confidentiality of commercial information can 
inhibit transparency in benefit-sharing which might 
otherwise ensue as a result of diligent conduct. 
Greater transparency, use of available leverage and 
open negotiations in the pursuit of due diligence 
can aid rather than contradict, responsible 
corporate behavior in an ABS context.
8. Disclosure, Transparency and public 
confidence
8.1 Due diligence includes transparency of information 
with due regard to confidentiality of business 
arrangements and competitive concerns.19 
8.2 Public reporting where possible will increase peer 
group confidence.
8.3 Due diligence reporting and transparency 
is enhanced by acknowledgement of the 
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source or origin20 of genetic resources used in 
publication or patent applications, even if they 
are representationally, structurally or functionally 
transformed in the research and utilization 
process. 
8.4 There are diverse immediate sources of traditional 
knowledge including those documented in 
scientific publications. If the user knows the 
indigenous community who holds the Associated 
Traditional Knowledge, disclosure in publications 
or patent applications should be traced to 
the community rather than just the scientific 
publication reporting on the traditional knowledge.
8.5 Transparency in use of all relevant traditional 
knowledge can aid efforts to map and demarcate 
traditional knowledge that is merely relevant from 
cases where traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources is tangibly used.
8.6 Any track and trace methods used as part of 
diligent conduct should aim to acknowledge legal 
track and trace as well as scientific and technical 
efforts to do so.
8.4 Transparency must ideally account for 
discontinuous scientific use that might require 
technical and scientific information to be kept 
beyond the legally required 20-year period.
9. Chain of custody of genetic resources 
and associated traditional knowledge:
9.1 In case of genetic resources accessed through 
intermediaries, it is prudent to obtain information 
regarding the chain of custody namely the 
succession of commercial and non-commercial 
operators who have used the genetic resource.21
9.2 At all times, practices and measures including 
scientific and technical actions in the chain 
of custody over genetic resources must be 
reasonably tested against due diligence and 
foundational responsibilities to follow provider 
country laws as well as obligations under EUR 
511/2014.
20 When origin and source are used together, the former may refer to in situ origins, whereas ‘source’ may refer to immediate source such as a collection. 
However in some legal systems ‘source’ may cover both - the country of origin, if applicable and known to the user/applicant, and if not, any other applicable 
and known source. For a detailed explanation of this concept of ‘source’ see the Submission by Switzerland in Response to Document WIPO/GRTKF/IC/30/9 
‘The Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in the Swiss Patent Act and Related Swiss Regulations on Genetic Resources’ 
Available here http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_31/wipo_grtkf_ic_31_8.pdf The LSE survey also found that the majority of users are in 
favor of such disclosure in patents and publications for both genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge.
21 See Guidance on EUR 511/2014 on indirect acquisition of Genetic Resources by intermediaries [2.1.3].
22 As reflected in clause 8 or Art 4, EUR 511/2014.
23 One of the ways in which to do this might be to assume due diligence in compliance for all users, which will be retracted in case of non-compliance. The 
consequent loss aversion could become a powerful incentive to comply.
10. Technical and scientific constraints
10.1 There may be extraordinary cases, such as public 
health concerns of international dimension where 
due diligence in the obligatory sense may make 
adhering to scientific protocols difficult.22 In 
such cases, and in the absence of sector specific 
guidance, it is advisable to assess whether 
technical and scientific protocols suffice as part 
of the appropriate, proportional and objective 
standard of due diligence.
11. Derivatives and Digital Sequence 
Information
11.1 Users should aim to apply the principles in this 
Recommendation to digital sequence information 
and derivatives to the best of their ability, and to 
apply a standard of conduct that does not frustrate 
the effective implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol.
12. Networks and organizations in 
compliance ecosystem
12.1 Funding organizations and formal research 
networks must develop effective messaging and 
develop incentives for the internalization of due 
diligence norms. 
12.2 Ratings or standards of ABS compliance may be 
used creatively to ensure diligent conduct, for 
example by research councils and grant making 
bodies.23
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3323389 
Department of Law
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
LONDON JANAURY 2019
lse.ac.uk/law
SIVA THAMBISETTY
Dr Siva Thambisetty is an Associate 
Professor of Law at the LSE. Her 
research interests include comparative 
and international patent law, emerging 
technologies, and institutional and 
regulatory aspects of intellectual property. 
She convenes advanced modules on patent 
Law, technology and innovation on the LLM 
and Executive LLM, and teaches copyright 
and patent law on the LLB program. 
Dr Thambisetty has been consulted 
by a number of bodies including the 
Nuffield Bioethics Council, UK Intellectual 
Property Office and the UK Government’s 
Commission for Intellectual Property 
Rights. Some of her publications appear 
in the Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Jurimetrics, 
European Intellectual Property Review, 
Intellectual Property Quarterly, Nature 
Biotechnology and the Journal of World 
Intellectual Property Law.
She is on the Faculty Advisory Board of 
the South Asia Centre at the LSE and 
currently holds a Horizon 2020 grant 
under the INMARE project to analyse the 
Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol 
in Europe.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3323389 
